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MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER: THE MAN ON THE RIGHT
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren con-
stituted one of the most controversial Courts in United States
history. From 1956 to 1961 the so-called "liberal bloc" of the
Court was composed of the Chief Justice and Justices Hugo
Black, William Douglas, and William Brennan. The
"conservative bloc" initially consisted of Justices Felix Frank-
furter, Harold Burton, John Harlan and Charles Whittaker,
who had replaced Stanley Reed in early 1957. Justice Burton
retired at the beginning of the 1958 term and was replaced by
Potter Stewart. Stewart and the remaining Justice, Tom Clark,
had conservative leanings.' Whittaker served four full terms,
1957-60, and two partial terms, 1956 and 1961.
While those who write about the Court find it convenient
to speak in terms of "blocs," it cannot be assumed that "the
number, size, composition and cohesion tendencies of blocs of
justices are constant."2 A study of the cases during this period
shows that Justice Whittaker disagreed with his colleagues in
the "conservative bloc" in a significant number of cases. This
comment focuses specifically on those cases where Whittaker
disagreed with either Frankfurter or Harlan (or both). The ob-
ject is to see if areas of disagreement or philosophical differ-
ences are evident from the cases.
The selected cases were read and categorized. Certain
cases were not considered: those in which there was not a full
review, those in which an opinion was not written, and per
curiam opinions.3 In those cases which overlapped, particular
effort was made to place the case in the category which best
reflected the area of disagreement between Whittaker and the
other two justices.4
An analysis was made of the cases in each category to
determine if there were major areas of disagreement or basic
philosophical differences. Emphasis was given to cases with
© 1979 by Barbara Christensen.
1. P. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT, 502-04 (1969).
2. Ulmer, The Analysis of Behavior Patterns on the United States Supreme
Court, 22 J. oF POL. 629, 633 (1960).
3. This is in keeping with the method followed in other Supreme Court History
Project articles.
4. See app. A, infra.
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opinions by Whittaker, whether majority, concurring, or dis-
senting.
Over a period of five years Whittaker's average disagree-
ment rate with Frankfurter was 21.15%; with Harlan it was
21.12%. The cases in which disagreement was the greatest oc-
curred in the area of labor relations (where Whittaker was more
conservative), and criminal procedure (where Whittaker was
more liberal). The other categories classifed were: 1) govern-
ment regulation; 2) federal and state taxation; 3) civil proce-
dure; 4) political freedom and citizenship; and, 5) constitu-
tional issues. Although the disagreement rates were measura-
ble, they do not seem to have emerged from any basic philo-
sophical differences among Frankfurter, Harlan and Whit-
taker.
The first section of this comment looks at the background
and career of Whittaker and briefly discusses his voting pat-
tern. In the second section certain categories of cases are con-
sidered according to the issues of disagreement. The final sec-
tion considers Whittaker's performance as a Supreme Court
Justice.
WHITrAKER-THE MAN
Early Life and Education
Charles Evans Whittaker was born on his father's farm
near Troy, Kansas, on February 22, 1901. He attended the local
school through ninth grade and then attended high school for
approximately one and a half years. Following the death of his
mother in 1917, Whittaker quit high school.'
During his youth he had supplemented the family income
by trapping small animals, such as skunks, for their pelts and
by hunting game. He continued these activities and worked on
his father's farm from 1917 to 1920, saving money to continue
his education. In 1920 Whittaker went to Kansas City, Mis-
souri, to enroll at Kansas City School of Law (now the Univer-
sity of Kansas City School of Law). His application was origi-
nally rejected due to his failure to complete high school. He
managed to convince university officials to let him take law
school classes while being tutored in any subjects necessary to
5. Nomination of Charles E. Whittaker to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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complete his high school education.'
During the day Whittaker worked as an office boy and
messenger for the law firm of Watson, Gage & Ess. Three
nights a week he attended law school; the other two nights he
studied high school subjects with private tutors. He completed
law school and high school in 1924; he had passed the Missouri
state bar examination in 1923, while still in school.'
The Lawyer
Upon graduating from law school, Whittaker joined Wat-
son, Gage & Ess. He remained with the firm for thirty years,
becoming a junior partner in 1928 and a full partner in 1932.
At that time the firm became known as Watson, Ess, Whit-
taker, Marshall & Enggass.8
The firm, one of the largest law firms in Missouri, handled
many large corporate clients in the Kansas City area. These
included Union Pacific and Southern Pacific Railroads, Mont-
gomery Ward, City National Bank & Trust Company, Kansas
City Public Service, Minneapolis-Moline, and the Kansas City
Star. Whittaker was a litigation partner in the firm from 1928
to 1942. He then limited his trial work, concentrating instead
on office counseling, financial advising, and representation of
banks.9 His reputation was that of an outstanding trial and
appellate attorney: a "lawyer's lawyer".' 0
Whittaker became involved in bar association activities,
eventually becoming president of the Missouri State Bar Asso-
ciation in 1953. Although he was not active in politics he be-
came well known to state Republican leaders both as a success-
ful lawyer and as the head of the state bar association."
The Judge
In 1954 a vacancy arose on the United States District
Court for the Western District of Missouri. Herbert Brownell,
then Attorney General, canvassed local political, labor, and bar
leaders concerning possible candidates. Whittaker's name was
6. L. Friedman, Charles Whittaker, in THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SU-
PREME COURT 1789-1969, at 2894 (L. Friedman and F. Israel eds. 1969).
7. Id.
8. Hearings, supra note 5, at 34 (statement of Charles E. Whittaker).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1 (statement of Stuart Symington).
11. New York Times, March 3, 1957, at 1, col. 1.
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enthusiastically suggested. President Eisenhower's brother
Arthur, a Kansas City banker and close friend of Whittaker's,
Roy Roberts, Republican publisher of the Kansas City Star,
and Harry Darby and Frank Carlson, Republican Senators
from Kansas, also pushed for Whittaker's nomination.'2 Im-
pressed, Brownell recommended the appointment. President
Eisenhower nominated him and the Senate rapidly confirmed
the nomination. Whittaker assumed his first judicial position
on July 6, 1954.13
As a federal district court judge, Whittaker rapidly cleared
the dockets of the case backlog which had developed prior to
his appointment. Forty-seven of his opinions were published;
thirty-three were of a procedural nature and the remainder
concerned various civil matters and a few criminal cases.4
Two years later, in June, 1956, Whittaker was appointed
to a vacancy on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. He sat
on that court for eight months. During this time he continued
to impress his fellow judges with his efficiency and hard work.
As an appellate judge, Whittaker wrote eleven opinions and
one dissenting opinion. Eight of these were Tax Court appeals;
three others involved government regulations and agencies."5
The Justice
In early 1957 Justice Reed announced his retirement. Pres-
ident Eisenhower had established certain criteria for nomina-
tion to the Supreme Court: (1) character and ability that could
command respect and confidence; (2) a basic philosophy of
moderate progressivism, common sense, and high ideals; (3)
prior judicial service; (4) geographic balance; (5) religious bal-
ance; (6) an upper age limit of sixty-two; (7) a thorough F.B.I.
check of the candidate and his approval by the American Bar
Association."6
Whittaker met all these criteria. He had a record as an
outstanding corporate lawyer and was a conservative Republi-
can, but had tried genuinely to be non-partisan in his public
and private careers. He had enthusiastic backing from the
bench, the bar, and the local Republican political leaders. In
12. H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS, 248 (1974).
13. Friedman, supra note 6, at 2895.
14. Volz, Mr. Justice Whittaker, 33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 159, 168-69 (1958).
15. Id. at 169.
16. ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 235.
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addition, Whittaker was from a mid-central state (as Justice
Reed had been), was a Methodist, and was only fifty-six. On
strong recommendations the President nominated Whittaker
as an Associate Justice on March 2, 1957.11
Senate confirmation hearings were held on March 18. The
only party to oppose Whittaker's nomination was Fyke Farmer,
who objected to the nominee because of a decision he had ren-
dered as a federal district court judge." The Judiciary Commit-
tee paid little attention to Farmer's protests. 9 The Committee
unanimously recommended confirmation, which occurred on
March 19.20 Whittaker was commissioned three days later and
took his seat on March 25.21
Whittaker aligned himself with the conservatives on the
Court, although he did not always vote with the Frankfurter-
Harlan group. On April 1, 1962, after only five years, he retired
mentally and physically exhausted from his work on the Court.
Whittaker resigned his commission as an Associate Justice
September 30, 1965.22
VOTING PAITERNS: WHITAKER AND THE CONSERVATIVE BLOC
Labor Relations
There were more instances of disagreement between Whit-
taker and Frankfurter and Harlan in the area of labor relations
than in any other area.23 The cases dealt with the construction
and application of various Congressional statutes. Whittaker's
position was more restrictive of the rights of labor than were
those of Frankfurter and Harlan.
17. Id. at 247-48.
18. Davis v. University of Kansas City, 129 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
Farmer, an attorney, had represented Horace B. Davis, a professor who had been fired
for refusing to answer questions posed to him by the Senate Internal Security Subcom-
mittee and the University trustees concerning his possible affiliation with the Com-
munist Party. Davis brought suit claiming he had tenure and could be fired for
"adequate cause" only. He maintained refusal to answer was not "adequate cause."
Whittaker dismissed his complaint, finding refusal to answer did constitute "adequate
cause."
19. Hearings, supra note 5, at 5-31 (testimony of Fyke Farmer).
20. Whittaker's treatment before the Judiciary Committee was much gentler
than that given the three previous Eisenhower nominees-Warren, Harlan and Bren-
nan. L. KATCHER, EARL WARREN, 362 (1967).
21. 353 U.S. IX-XI (1957).
22. New York Times, Nov. 27, 1973, at 44, col. 1. Whittaker did not participate
in public life to any significant degree. He did not sit as a federal judge after retiring.
He died November 26, 1973, in Kansas City.
23. See app. A, infra.
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The Power of the NLRB. Illustrative are a number of cases
concerning the powers of the National Labor Relations Board
(Board) to take affirmative action to effectuate the policies of
the National Labor Relations Act (Act). 4 Douglas wrote all the
majority opinions; 5 Whittaker dissented to all of them. Harlan
joined the majority. Frankfurter did not participate.
Local 60, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB 6
concerned an order of the Board directing a union to refund
employee dues and work permit fees collected under an illegal
closed-shop hiring arrangement. 7 The Court found the Board
had no power to order the refund in the absence of evidence
that membership in the union was "influenced or compelled by
reason of unfair labor practices. '28
Harlan, in his concurring opinion, thought the Board
should be denied the use of dues-reimbursement relief in situa-
tions of imputed coercion. He felt it was "not unlikely that a
substantial number of employees were willing to pay dues for
union membership" and there was "no rational relationship
between the amount of dues paid and the value an employee
who is willing to join a union would place on his [statutory]
freedom to change his mind. '2 9
Whittaker dissented. He deferred to the Board's expertise,
arguing that, even in the absence of specific proof of injury to
all employees, the Board could conclude that full restitution by
the union of dues collected under an illegal arrangement was
necessary to effectutate the policies of the Act. Despite the ban
on closed-shop practices, such arrangements still flourished.
The Board had concluded that something more effective than
a cease and desist order was needed and had imposed the reim-
bursement requirement. Whittaker thought this was clearly
within the Board's powers. The order was not a "penalty"
which the Board had no power to assess, but rather a permissi-
ble method of depriving the union of advantages gained from
subverting the Act.3
24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
25. International Typographical Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 705 (1961); NLRB v.
News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961); Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961); Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S.
651 (1961).
26. 365 U.S. -651 (1961).
27. Closed-shop hiring clauses require membership in a union before the em-
ployee can obtain employment.
28. 365 U.S. at 655.
29. Id. at 659-60 (concurring opinion).
30. Id. at 662-77 (dissenting opinion).
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Whittaker adopted the same rationale in other cases in
which he supported the Board's power to require reimburse-
ment of dues and assessments. Local 357, International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters v. NLRB3' involved an agreement between
the union and an employer that required the employer to hire
temporary employees only if referred through a union hiring
hall. The Board found this arrangement illegal per se and or-
dered reimbursement of fees and dues paid by all temporary
employees to the union.3
The majority, Harlan concurring, set aside the reimburse-
ment order and held that the agreement was not illegal per se
since it provided that there be no discrimination against tem-
porary employees because of the presence or absence of union
membership. The Act was violated only when discrimination
was, in fact, practiced against non-union members.3 As Harlan
said, "a mere showing of foreseeable encouragement of union
status [was] not sufficient basis for finding a violation."'34
The Injunctive Power of the Federal Courts. Another series
of cases dealt with the extent to which the Norris-Laguardia
Act 3 limited the power of federal courts to issue injunctions in
labor disputes .3 The majority, including Harlan and some-
times Frankfurter, gave a broad reading to the anti-injunction
provisions of this act. In Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago
& N. W. Railway, 7 the railroad had submitted plans to state
public utility commissions to abolish certain unnecessary sta-
tions and positions. The union threatened a railroad strike to
enforce its demand that the current bargaining agreement be-
tween the railroad and the union be amended so that none of
the jobs could be abolished without the consent of the union.
Black, writing for the majority, held that the controversy re-
lated to an effort on the part of the union to change the "terms"
of an existing collective bargaining agreement; the matter was
clearly within "conditions of employement"-hence the strike
could not be enjoined.38
31. 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
32. Id. at 668-70.
33. Id. at 676-77.
34. Id. at 679 (concurring opinion).
35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970).
36. A lawful labor dispute under § 113(c) to the Act included any controversy
concerning terms or conditions of employment; union and management were required
to bargain concerning these items.
37. 362 U.S. 330 (1960), rehearing denied, 362 U.S. 984 (1960).
38. Id. at 336.
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Whittaker, dissenting, maintained that the union's de-
mand did not relate to rates of compensation or working condi-
tions. He believed Congress had declared its labor policy in
several related acts, which had to be read together as an inte-
grated plan of regulation. He found that the union's demand
was not a lawfully bargainable subject under the Railway
Labor Act because it was opposed to the policies of the Inter-
state Commerce Act. Thus it was exempted from the Norris-
Laguardia Act's prohibition on injunctions."9
Whittaker was more inclined to find that the controversies
in the cases did not constitute a lawful labor dispute within the
meaning of the Act. 0 His position would have allowed district
courts broad discretionary powers in enjoining strikes.
His position against restricting the power of the district
courts in the area of labor relations is also seen in his majority
opinion in Leedom v. Kyne." The Board had failed to take a
vote of professional employees in determining whether or not
certain non-professional employees should be included with
them in a collective bargaining unit. Section 9(b)(1) of the
National Labor Relations Act" required approval of the inclu-
sion by a majority of the professionals. The employees associa-
tion asked the Board to amend its decision. The Board refused
and conducted a representation election. After the election the
association brought suit in district court to set aside the
Board's determination of the bargaining unit and the election.
The Board contended that the district court lacked jurisdic-
tion.
In his opinion Whittaker noted that the district court
would have jurisdiction under § 24 (8) of the Judicial Code"1
unless the review provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act destroyed it. The suit, he said, was "not one to 'review'...
a decision of the Board made within its jurisdiction. Rather it
[was] one to strike down an order of the Board made in excess
of its delegated powers . . . ."" The attempted exercise of
power deprived professional employees of a right granted by
39. Id. at 352-59 (dissenting opinion).
40. See Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co. 362 P .S. 365 (1960),
rehearing denied, 363 U.S. 809 (1960). Whittaker was the lone dissenter; he based his
argument on the rationale he developed in Order of R.R. Telegraphers.
41. 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976).
44. 358 U.S. at 188.
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Congress; the federal district courts had jurisdiction to prevent
a deprivation of such a right.
Frankfurter joined Brennan in dissent. They asserted that
under the Act judicial review was limited to courts of appeal
after the Board had ordered an employer to do something based
on election results. They feared that under the majority posi-
tion the tactic of litigation could be used to delay the initiation
of collective bargaining."
Employee Injury Cases. Another area of concern to the
Court was employee injury cases arising under various federal
statutes. Whittaker was less inclined than Frankfurter or Har-
lan to interpret basic policy questions in favor of the injured
employee.
This position can be seen in Still v. Norfolk and Western
Railway." Still sued the railroad under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act (FELA),17 claiming he received back injuries at
work as a result of negligent conduct by his fellow employees.
Still had made fraudulent misrepresentations about his health
at the time he had been hired and the railroad had relied on
these in hiring him. A question arose as to whether the railroad
could escape liability under FELA by proving this.
Harlan joined the majority in holding that, even though he
could be terminated for the fraud, the plaintiff was an em-
ployee under FELA and therefore could recover.48 The Court
limited to its precise facts Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste.
Marie Railway v. Rock," which seemed to bar recovery, and
ordered a new trial.
Frankfurter concurred because he thought the question of
fraud in obtaining employment should not have been with-
drawn from the jury.-
Whittaker dissented in strong terms:
45. Id. at 192 (dissenting opinion).
46. 368 U.S. 35 (1961). See also Alaska Ind. Bd. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 365 U.S.
320 (1958).
47. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976). FELA required the railroad to pay damages for
injuries negligently inflicted on their employees.
48. 368 U.S. at 44-45.
49. 279 U.S. 410, 414-15 (1929). Rock held that an employee who obtained em-
ployment by having someone else impersonate him at a required pre-employment
physical examination could not recover under the Act for personal injuries sustained
during employment despite the fact that his physical condition had not caused the
injuries.
50. 368 U.S. at 47 (concurring opinion).
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The question is whether, despite his flagrant fraud, in pro-
curing the employee status, he may have the special bene-
fits, and freedom from the normal defenses, given by Con-
gress in the Federal Employers' Liability Act to one who
has honestly acquired the status of and is truly an em-
ployee of a railroad. I think Congress did not intend to give
those special benefits to a person who has acquired a puta-
tive employment relationship with a railroad by flagrant
fraud, whether that fraud falls within the "precise facts"
of the Rock case or within any of the myriad variations
thereof.5'
Whittaker could not agree to a repudiation of the principle
"that fraud in the inducement of a contract vitiates the con-
tract.""
Specific Performance of Arbitration Clauses. Three related
cases-Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,53 General Electric Co.
v. Local 205, Electrical Workers,54 and Goodall-Sanford v. Tex-
tile Workers"5-involved suits brought by labor unions seeking
specific performance of arbitration provisions in collective bar-
gaining agreements. These cases show a clear difference in ap-
proach among the three justices.
Whittaker joined the majority opinions by Douglas. The
Court held that section 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947 (LMRA) 6 was not merely jurisdictional but
authorized federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for
the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. This in-
cluded authority to grant specific performance of arbitration
provisions contained in such agreements. 7
Harlan joined Burton in concurring in the result. However,
they interpreted section 301 as giving the federal courts protec-
tive jurisdiction only. This-interpretation permitted the appli-
cation of federal remedial law, but required the applicable sub-
51. Id. at 49 (dissenting opinion).
52. Id.
53. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
54. 353 U.S. 547 (1957).
55. 353 U.S. 550 (1957).
56. Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970). Sec-
tion 301(a) provides in part that suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of 
the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy.
57. 353 U.S. at 445-59.
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stantive law to be state law. 8
Frankfurter dissented. He said Congress had not intended
specific enforcement of such arbitration clauses. Section 301
was jurisdictional only; the law to be applied was solely state
law. According to Frankfurter any attempt to grant federal
courts jurisdiction over contracts arising under state substan-
tive law was unconstitutional.59
In the field of labor relations, there appears to be a discern-
ible pattern in Justice Whittaker's voting behavior that placed
him to the right of his fellow conservatives, Frankfurter and
Harlan. His votes against labor unions and for the Board or the
courts placed him in disagreement with his bloc in a greater
percentage of the cases than in most other areas.
Federal and State Taxation
Cases involving federal and state taxation produced an-
other area of major disagreement between Frankfurter, Harlan,
and Whittaker." Whittaker seemed more willing than the
other two Justices to vote against the governmental body im-
posing the tax.
State Taxes. Whittaker wrote the majority opinion in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers.' The issue was
whether certain imported goods had lost their distinctive char-
acter as imports, removing their immunity from state taxation
under the import-export clause of the Constitution." The
goods-iron ore and wood veneer and lumber-were stored by
the manufacturers in their original packaging or form.
The majority focused on whether the manufacturers had
acted upon the imported materials by irrevocably committing
them to use in manufacturing at the plant. The Court empha-
sized that the goods were imported to supply, and were essen-
tial to, the manufacturer's current operating needs. Indiscrimi-
nate portions of the goods actually were being used to supply
daily operating needs. They were thus part of the manufactur-
ing process and had lost the tax immunity of an import. Be-
cause the goods were being put to the use for which they were
58. Id. at 460 (concurring opinion).
59. Id. at 461-84 (dissenting opinion).
60. See app. A, infra.
61. 358 U.S. 534 (1959).
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 reads in part, "No state shall, without the
consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports . ..."
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imported, the fact that they remained in their "original pack-
ages" was immaterial. 3
Frankfurter and Harlan disagreed. For them the key fact
was that the goods were still in the original package or form,
and were clearly identifiable. Most imports, they said, were
committed for use in manufacture. To say that the goods were
actually being used to supply daily requirements meant only
that the imports were awaiting their intended, but not yet
begun, manufacturing process. They maintained such goods
were still imports, immune from state taxation. 4
Whittaker's position in Youngstown, supporting state tax-
ation of business, was not typical of his general attitude on
state taxation. More representative are three cases concerning
state taxes levied on federal property being used by, or in the
possession of, private parties. The majority in each case found
that the tax did not infringe on the federal government's im-
munity from state taxation. Whittaker dissented in each case,
finding the tax unconstitutional because it was laid on the
property of the government.
Frankfurter and Harlan agreed with Whittaker in City of
Detroit v. Murray Corp.65 A subcontractor under a government
contract was taxed on the value of materials and work in prog-
ress in his possession, although the federal government held
title to them under the terms of the subcontract. The Justices
agreed that the tax was unconstitutional since it was imposed
on materials actually owned by the government on the date of
asessment16
The two Justices did not join in Whittaker's dissent in the
other two cases. United States v. City of Detroit" and United
States v. Township of Muskegon 8 concerned state taxes levied
against private parties who used real property belonging to the
federal government in private businesses conducted for profit.
They were taxed as though they owned the property. In City
of Detroit the corporation had leased a portion of a government
owned industrial plant. In Muskegon the taxpayer was using
the property under a permit, not a lease; the property was
being used in the fulfillment of government contracts.
63. 358 U.S. at 543-49.
64. Id. at 566-70 (dissenting opinion).
65. 355 U.S. 489 (1958).
66. Id. at 533 (dissenting opinion).
67. 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
68. 355 U.S. 484 (1958).
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Whittaker argued in City of Detroit that there were two
estates, the government's estate consisting of the entire prop-
erty and the leasehold owned by the taxpayer. The state had
imposed a tax on the government, he said, because it taxed the
lessee as if he owned the entire estate, rather than just taxing
the value of the lease, which was all that belonged to the tax-
payer." In Muskegon the taxpayer did not even own a leasehold
that could be taxed; the entire property being taxed belonged
to the government. 0
Harlan joined the opinion of the Court in both cases, find-
ing lessees' and users' taxes to be taxes on the privilege of us-
ing tax exempt property. Such taxes were constitutional. Har-
lan charged that the dissent "[equated] the measure of the
tax with the subject of the tax."'
Frankfurter concurred. In taxing the enjoyment or use of
property that was itself free from taxation the state was, he
said, taxing the interest of the taxpayer, not the property of the
federal government. This distinction was not lost because the
measure of the tax was the same in either case.7"
Frankfurter's and Harlan's willingness to support state
taxation is evident in cases involving state taxes levied against
corporations engaged in interstate commerce.7 3
Whittaker's attitude on the subject is best seen in
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota."4 The
case concerned the constitutionality of non-discriminatory
state net income tax laws which levied taxes on that portion of
a foreign corporation's net income earned from, and fairly ap-
portionable to, business activities within the state when those
activities were exclusively part of interstate commerce.
The majority found the taxing scheme to be consistent
with precedents. States already were free to impose a nondis-
criminatory net income tax on a corporation engaged in both
69. 355 U.S. at 481-83 (dissenting opinion).
70. 355 U.S. at 488 (dissenting opinion).
71. 355 U.S. at 506.
72. Id. at 502-03.
73. See Scripto v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960), and R.E.A. v. Virginia, 358 U.S.
434 (1959). In R.E.A. they concurred with a franchise tax measured by gross receipts
derived from transportation within Virginia of goods being moved in interstate com-
merce. In Scripto, Florida levied a use tax against a foreign corporation which had
failed to collect the use tax from its Florida customers as required by state law. Harlan
joined the majority and Frankfurter concurred in a finding that the requirement did
not place a burden on interstate commerce. Whittaker dissented in both.
74. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
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interstate and intrastate commerce, taxing the intrastate in-
come. To permit the state within which a corporation engaged
solely in interstate commerce to tax the net income derived
from that state on a properly apportioned basis in no way regu-
lated or increased the burden on interstate commerce.75
Whittaker strongly disagreed. He maintained that the fact
that the tax could be fairly apportioned was of no legal conse-
quence. The income being taxed was derived exclusively from
interstate commerce. Direct taxation of pure interstate com-
merce was substantial regulation of such commerce. The com-
merce clause 7 denied the states power to regulate interstate
commerce. The state laws, as far as Whittaker was concerned,
were unconstitutional; the majority holding was a break with
precedents."
Federal Taxes. In cases involving disputes between the
individual and the Internal Revenue Service, Whittaker was
more inclined to support the claims of the taxpayer than were
Frankfurter and Harlan. This is seen, for instance, in
Commissioner v. Acker.78 Acker failed to file estimated tax re-
turns for the years 1947-1950, in violation of section 58 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939.11 Failure to file the declaration
subjected him to payment of a penalty prescribed by section
294(d)(1)(A).80 The Internal Revenue Service also imposed a
further penalty under section 294(d)(2),1' claiming that his fail-
ure to file an estimated tax declaration amounted to a substan-
tial underestimation of his tax.
Whittaker, writing for the Court, disagreed. He catego-
rized section 294(d)(2) as a penalty. A person was not subject
to a penalty under proper statutory construction unless the
words of the statute plainly imposed it. He was unable to find
any language in the statute that authorized the treatment of a
75. Id. at 463-65, 469 (Harlan, J., concurring).
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
77. 358 U.S. at 496-97 (dissenting opinion).
78. 361 U.S. 87 (1959).
79. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 58, 53 Stat. 32 (now I.R.C. § 6015(d)) re-
quired a taxpayer to file a yearly declaration of estimated tax if his gross income from
wages or other sources was expected to exceed specified amounts. Among other things,
he had to state the estimated tax owed and the estimated credits against this tax.
80. Int. Rev. Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 118(a), 58 Stat. 37 (now I.R.C. § § 6651, 6654)
required specified charges assessed in case of failure to make and file a declaration of
estimated tax.
81. Int. Rev. Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 118(a), 58 Stat. 37 (now I.R.C. § 6654) added
a charge for substantial underestimation of estimated tax if 80% of the tax actually
owed exceeded the total amount of the estimated tax.
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taxpayer's failure to file a declaration of estimated tax as the
equivalent of a declaration estimating no tax."2
Frankfurter, with the concurrence of Clark and Harlan,
dissented. He argued that section 294(d)(2) was not a penalty
but an interest charge, designed to compensate the Treasury
for delay in the receipt of funds that a reasonably accurate
estimate would have shown were due and owing.8' The Court,
he said, should follow the legislative report on the meaning of
the statutes; Congress intended failure to file a declaration
when due to be the equivalent of a statement that the amount
of estimated tax owed was zero. 84
Although Whittaker's disagreement with Frankfurter and
Harlan in the taxation cases is documented it does not seem
to present or prove any basic philosophical difference between
the Justices. It is consistent with his conservative leanings
against governmental powers.
Criminal Law and Procedure
In the area of criminal law and criminal procedure, how-
ever, Whittaker, often without explanation, joined the liberal
position. His vote was crucial, for instance, in Moore v.
Michigan,8" a five-four decision ordering a new trial for a
seventeen-year-old black with a seventh grade education and
a history of head injuries. The youth had pleaded guilty to a
charge of murder without benefit of counsel. The majority con-
cluded there was no showing of a willing or meaningful waiver
of the right to counsel.
His vote was also decisive in Green v. United States,"'
another five-four decision. The defendant had been tried for
first-degree murder but the jury had found him guilty of only
second-degree murder. The Court ruled he could not be retried
on the more serious charge if a new trial were ordered as that
would place him in double jeopardy.
Whittaker took a restrictive position in other cases, such
as those involving coerced or involuntary confessions. In Reck
v. Pate,87 for example, the petitioner claimed he had been de-
82. 361 U.S. at 91.
83. Id. at 95 n.1 (dissenting opinion).
84. Id. at 94-96.
85. 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
86. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
87. 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
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nied due process under the fourteenth amendment"5 by the
admission into evidence at his murder trial of an allegedly
coerced confession. Reck was a nineteen-year-old of subnormal
intelligence. After he had been held incommunicado several
days and subjected to long stretches of interrogation he was
confronted with confessions made by his companions. Physi-
cally weakened and in pain, he confessed to the murder.
Frankfurter and Harlan joined in Stewart's majority opin-
ion, holding that the confession was coerced and its admission
as evidence violative of due process."9 Whittaker joined Clark
in dissent; they protested the Court's overturning "so many
decisions by so many judges, both state and federal, entirely
upon psychological grounds." 0
Whittaker also joined the more liberal justices in cases
involving questions of criminal procedure. The decisions in
these cases were beneficial to the individual rather than the
government. Frankfurter and Harlan usually dissented." This
pattern is seen, for example, in Lott v. United States,"2 a five-
four opinion written by Whittaker.
The defendants in Lott were prosecuted for attempting
and conspiring to evade payment of income tax owed by their
corporate employer. The district court accepted pleas of nolo
contendere on behalf of some of the defendants on March 17,
1959. The court decided to postpone pronouncement of judg-
ment until conclusion of the impending jury trials of two other
defendants. On June 19 the court orally pronounced judgment
and sentenced the defendants. Three days later a formal judg-
ment was filed. June 13 defendants filed motions in arrest of
judgment. Upon denial of those motions they filed notices of
appeal on July 15 and 17. The Court of Appeals dismissed their
appeals as untimely, stating under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 343 the defendants' pleas of nolo contendere had
constituted a "determination of guilt.""
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, reads in part "nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .
89. 367 U.S. at 441-44.
90. Id. at 455 (dissenting opinion). See also Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568 (1961).
91. See, e.g., Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631 (1961), Burns v. Ohio, 360
U.S. 252 (1959), and Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1 (1959).
92. 367 U.S. 421 (1961).
93. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 34 required a motion in arrest of judg-
ment be made five days "after determination of guilt."
94. 367 U.S. at 423-24.
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In his majority opinion Whittaker started with the propo-
sition that a plea of nolo contendere was the same as an admis-
sion of guilt. However, a plea or admission did not constitute
conviction or a determination of guilt. Therefore, it did not
dispose of the case and could be withdrawn, with the consent
of the court, at any time before the court rendered its pro-
nouncement of judgment imposing a sentence. Thus, he con-
cluded, it was the judgment of conviction and sentence, not the
tender and acceptance of the plea of nolo contendere that con-
stituted the "determination of guilt" under Rule 34. Conse-
quently the appeals were timely. 5
Frankfurter, Harlan, and Stewart joined Clark's dissent.
They argued the acceptance of the pleas of nolo contendere was
the "determination of guilt." The court had nothing more to
do after accepting a plea of nolo contendere than it did after
accepting a guilty plea or after a jury had returned a verdict of
guilty. Until such time as the court granted a motion to with-
draw the plea the effect was identical. The minority charged
the Court's decision had enlarged the time provided in the
Rules for taking action."
The three Justices again showed a difference in approach
in several companion cases considering the validity of peace-
time court-martial trials of civilians accompanying the armed
forces overseas. Article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice97 extended jurisdiction of the court-martial to persons
employed by, or accompanying, the armed forces outside the
United States."
Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton" raised the
issue of the applicability of Article 2(11) to civilian dependents
charged with noncapital offenses. Similar questions concerning
civilian employees who had committed capital or noncapital
95. Id. at 426.
96. Id. at 431-32.
97. 10 U.S.C. § 802(11) (1958).
98. The Court previously had considered the applicability of Article 2(11) to a
civilian dependent who had committed a capital offense while accompanying the
armed forces overseas in peacetime in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). It decided that
any power to try civilians had to be found solely in article I, § 8, clause 14, granting
Congress the power "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces." The test for jurisdicion was one of "status", i.e., whether the accused
in a court-martial proceeding fell within the term "land and naval forces." Constitu-
tional considerations required this term to be read in a restrictive manner. The Court
held civilian dependents charged with capital offenses could not be tried by court-
martial in peacetime.
99. 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
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offenses were raised in Grisham v. Hagan'"" and McElroy v.
United States ex rel. Guagliardo.'0'
The majority held that prosecution and conviction by
court-martial of civilian dependents or employees was consti-
tutionally impermissible. Whether the crime charged was capi-
tal or noncapital, such persons were guaranteed normal jury
trials under article III10 and the fifth'03 and sixth"4 amend-
ments to the Constitution.'
Harlan, joined by Frankfurter, maintained that civilian
employees and dependents properly came under military juris-
diction in noncapital cases.'"6 He argued congressional power to
regulate the land and naval forces was to be read in light of the
necessary and proper clause. 07 "The true issue was whether or
not the relationship between the person affected and the mili-
tary establishment was "close enough so that Congress may
• . . deem it 'necessary' that the military be given jurisdiction
to deal with offenses committed by such a person.""'" Harlan
found the necessary relationship existed as to both employees
and dependents. He concluded that military justice was none-
theless improper in capital cases, whose "awesome finality"
weighed heavily against denial of "the special procedural safe-
guards which have been thrown around those charged with
such crimes."'"
Whittaker, writing for himself and Stewart, agreed that
there was no constitutional distinction between capital and
noncapital cases as regards civilian dependents accompanying
the armed forces. They were not subject to court-martial."" He
found, however, a "marked and clear difference" between those
dependents and civilian employees.
100. 361 U.S. 278 (1960).
101. 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
102. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3, provided "the trial of all Crimes . . . shall
be by Jury .... "
103. Id. amend. V states: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury
104. Id. amend. VI, requires that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury .... "
105. 361 U.S. at 247-49; 361 U.S. at 280; 361 U.S. at 283-84.
106. 361 U.S. at 250.
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, gave Congress the power "[to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the [enumerated]
Powers .... "
108. 361 U.S. at 257.
109. Id. at 255.
110. Id. at 263-64.
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[Civilian employees] are so intertwined with those forces
and military communities as to be in every practical sense
an integral part of them. On the other hand, civilian de-
pendents "accompanying the armed forces" perform no
services for those forces, present dissimilar security and
disciplinary problems, have only a few of the military priv-
ileges, and generally stand in a very different relationship
to those forces than the civilian employee."'
Based on this and the historical pattern of military jurisdiction
over such civilians, he concluded that civilian employees of the
armed forces could be tried by court-martial for capital or non-
capital offenses."'
Overall, there does not appear to be any pattern to the
disagreement in the criminal law area."' Although there were
a number of cases in the area where Whittaker joined the lib-
eral bloc, "Iflor the most part . . .Whittaker voted for the
liberal position in cases of clear individual injustice where the
decisions had extremely limited application and the emotional
appeal of the case was particularly strong.""' 4 His liberal votes
were not due to a major shift in outlook.
Other Catagories of Disagreement
The other categories of cases classified in this study pro-
duced similar results. That is, although the so-called conserva-
tive Justices on the Supreme Court during Whittaker's tenure
did not vote as a bloc, the disagreements among them fail to
produce a pattern reflecting basic philosophical differences.
That being the case, it is difficult to clearly define the judicial
philosophy of Justice Whittaker.
Government Regulation. In this area Whittaker was more
inclined than Frankfurter or Harlan to find the arguments on
behalf of the regulation or agency under consideration unpersu-
asive. The cases in the area, however, cover a variety of sub-
jects and are illustrative only of general attitudes." ' Whittaker
111. Id. at 265.
112. Id. at 266-76.
113. See app. A, infra.
114. Friedman, supra note 6, at 2897.
115. For example, Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960), considered whether
racial discrimination in services within a bus terminal restaurant was barred by the
Interstate Commerce Act. The majority found the restaurant an integral part of the
carrier's transportation service for interstate passengers; thus racial discrimination was
barred by the Act. Whittaker dissented, maintaining the restaurant was not even
indirectly operated or controlled by the carriers.
19791 1057
1058 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19
opposed decisions of the ICC in several cases. His reasons
usually were either that the evidence was insufficient to sup-
port the ICC's findings"' or that the commission had failed to
adequately and correctly apply the regulations and standards
for issuing certificates of public convenience and necessity to
carriers."'
Civil Procedure. Whittaker disagreed with both Frank-
furter and Harlan in most of the cases in this area."" Whit-
taker's attitude on venue was narrower than those of Frank-
furter and Harlan, calling for considerable restrictions on avail-
able places for bringing suit. This restrictive approach is typi-
cal of many of his decisions in civil procedure cases. For exam-
ple, Whittaker wrote for the Court in Hoffman v. Blaski;"'5 the
decision holding that section 1404(a), 2e the change of venue
statute, did not authorize the transfer of an action to any dis-
trict in which the plaintiff could not have brought the action
originally. This gave the narrowest possible scope to the opera-
Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, rehearing denied, 368 U.S. 1005 (1961), on the
other hand, concerned the effect of the Tobacco Inspection Act on the state of Georgia's
tobacco identification law. The majority found federal legislation had pre-empted the
area. Whittaker concurred in the result without any explanation, while Frankfurter
and Harlan argued that there was no pre-emption.
Whittaker was the sole dissenter in American Trucking Ass'ns Inc. v. Frisco
Transp. Co., 358 U.S. 133 (1958). The Interstate Commerce Commission had failed to
include a limiting condition in the certificate of public necessity and convenience
issued to a trucking service. The Court approved the Commission's correction of the
certificate on the ground that the omission was inadvertent. Whittaker, without ex-
planation, stated that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of mere inad-
vertent clerical error.
116. See also United States v. Drum, 368 U.S. 370 (1961), where he dissented
with Harlan.
117. See ICC v. J-T Transp. Co., 368 U.S. 81 (1961) iFrankfurter, J., joined by
Harlan, J., and Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting); Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United
States, 355 U.S. 83 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Pan-Atlantic S.S. Co. v. Atlan-
tic Coast Line R.R., 353 U.S. 436 (1957) (Burton, J., joined by Harlan, J., and Whit-
taker J., dissenting).
118. See app. A, infra.
119. 363 U.S. 335 (1960). The defendants in a patent infringement action moved
to transfer the action from the district court in Texas to the district court in Illinois.
The Texas court granted the motion over plaintiff's objections. The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit denied plaintiff's motion for writ of mandamus vacating the
transfer order. Plaintiff then filed a motion in the Illinois court for an order remanding
the action to the Texas court on the ground that the Texas court did not have the power
to make the transfer order. Although this motion was denied, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit subsequently granted the plaintiffs petition for a writ of manda-
mus directing the Illinois district court to vacate its order.
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) provides "for the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to
any other district or division where it might have been brought."
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tion of section 1404(a). It was immaterial that the defendant
subsequently waived any objection to venue in some other
forum. The determining situation was the one which existed at
the time plaintiff instituted the suit. 2 ' Frankfurter and Harlan
dissented, perceiving the problem as one of effective judicial
administration.1 2
Political Freedom and Citizenship. Again, the reasons for
disagreement between the three justices are often unclear.
Many times they disagreed only on whether the government
had met its burden of proof.1 2s Additionally, Whittaker joined
the liberal bloc only in decisions of narrow applicability, such
as in single instances of deportation 4 or denationalization.'"I
Constitutional Issues. Similarly, cases involving questions
of full faith and credit, the "taking" of property, and the first
amendment 26 did not seem to illustrate basic philosophical
differences between Justice Whittaker and Justices Frank-
furter and Harlan. Staub v. City of Baxley, 27 for example,
involved the first amendment rights of a union organizer who
had not obtained a permit to solicit membership under the
municipal ordinance. Whittaker's opinion held that the ordi-
nance was a prior restraint on free speech, 121 but his disagree-
ment with Frankfurter was over the issue of independent state
grounds. 2 19
APPRAISAL OF JUSTICE WHITTAKER
At the time of his appointment, Justice Whittaker re-
ceived wide and nearly universal acceptance and support. Few
of the newspapers or magazines were critical. 30 Yet today he
has been rated in such harsh terms as "a major disappointment
121. 363 U.S. at 343-44.
122. Id. at 347-48 (dissenting opinion).
123. See Maisenberg v. United States, 356 U.S. 670 (1958); Nowak v. United
States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958); Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958); Chaunt v.
United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960). Whittaker was inclined to find the government had
proven violation of the statutes involved.
124. Bonnetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691 (1958).
125. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, and Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
126. U.S. CONST. amend. I reads in part "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .
127. 355 U.S. 313 (1958).
128. Id. at 325.
129. Id. at 320, dissenting opinion at 329.
130. J. Ashby, Supreme Court Appointments Since 1937, at 263 (1972) (pub-
lished dissertation, University of Notre Dame).
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on the bench"' 3' and "near the bottom in terms of Court per-
formance."' 32
Certainly there was no lack of hard work. Whittaker felt
"[jiustice . . . in the main is . . . the product of long hours
of hard, diligent, painstaking labor by highly competent, expe-
rienced, careful and practical lawyers.""'3 Testimony of his fel-
low Justices indicates that Whittaker tried to follow this idea.
Chief Justice Warren stated: "His entire preoccupation was
with the law. He refused to leave time for any diversion." ''"1
Justice Douglas indicated Whittaker processed every case
"with a thoroughness never exceeded."' 33 "Justice Whittaker,"
according to Justice Harlan, "was a prodigious worker who was
satisfied with nothing less than full mastery of every record and
brief." 3 '
The main criticism of Whittaker is that he."made deci-
sions, but . . . enunciated no doctrine; he [took] positions,
but he . . . embraced no philosophy.' '3 7 Warren commented
that Whittaker's "opinions on a variety of subjects [would] be
read . . . for their thoroughness and for the convictions ex-
pressed."' Whittaker himself said he read the law only for an
understanding of its meaning, and then applied and enforced
it according to his understanding.' 3 He stated he was not con-
scious of having any political leanings or philosophy.""
The observation has been made that "[a] man who is not
conscious of any leanings is a man who has all the conventional
leanings of his time, class, and calling."' 4 ' Whittaker had the
conservative political, social and economic outlook one might
expect from a highly successful corporate lawyer from the mid-
United States.'
131. ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 247.
132. Id. at 235.
133. TIME, March 11, 1957, at 17.
134. Charles Evans Whittaker-the Supreme Court Years, 40 TEx. L. REV. 744,
744 (1962).
135. Id. at 745.
136. Id. at 748.
137. D. Berman, Mr. Justice Whittaker: A Preliminary Appraisal, 24 Mo. L.
REV. 1, 14 (1959).
138. Charles Evans Whittaker-the Supreme Court Years, supra note 134, at
744.
139. LIFE, July 1, 1957, at 36.
140. Berman, supra note 137 at 16 (quoting the Kansas City Star, March 3, 1957,
at 15).
141. Friedman, supra note 6, at 2896.
142. KATCHER, supra note 20, at 427.
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CONCLUSION
Although close study shows that in many cases Whittaker
disagreed with Frankfurter and Harlan, his colleagues in the
conservative bloc, much of the time he joined them, taking a
conservative position. Many of the disagreements among these
Justices involved labor relations, government regulation or tax-
ation. These were all areas with which, as a corporate lawyer,
Whittaker probably was most familiar. In all of these areas
Whittaker usually took the more conservative position. He was
more inclined to join the liberal Justices in questions of crimi-
nal law and procedure or political freedom and citizenship.
However, the cases examined do not show any major basic
philosophical differences between Whittaker and Frankfurter
or Harlan.
Although "[flive years on the Supreme Court is not suffi-
cient time for [Whittaker] to make known through his opin-
ions his entire philosophy of law and justice,' 4 3 it is long
enough for him to express any major differences in opinion
between himself and those with whom he normally agreed.
That he did not do so is indicative of disagreement based pri-
marily on a differing interpretation of the facts in individual
cases and a conservative position based mainly on unarticu-
lated instinct rather than a developed philosophy.'44
Barbara B. Christensen
143. Charles Evans Whittaker-the Supreme Court Years, supra note 134, at
744.
144. Friedman, supra note 6, at 2903.
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